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Skewes v. Shearson Lehman Bros.'
I. INTRODUCTION
With the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act [hereinafter F.A.A.]2 in
1925, Congress attempted to place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing
as other contracts."3 This Act, later described as a "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration, "' creates a presumption in favor of arbitration where ambiguities arise
as to the scope of an agreement.5 Under this interpretation, it appears that the
intent of the parties can be overlooked in favor of the federal policy favoring
arbitration. This is contrary to general principles of contract interpretation and
would appear to be a trap for those unfamiliar with this area of the law.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The dispute in Skewes arose out of an employer/employee relationship in
which the plaintiff, Blaine Skewes, was a stockbroker for the defendant, Shearson
Lehman. Shortly afterbeginning employment with Shearson Lehman, Skewes and
a Shearson agent executed a "Form U-4."6  The Form U-4 referred certain
disputes to arbitration in conformity with the rules of the organizations with which
Skewes was registered.7 In the Form U-4, Skewes indicated that he was to be
registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).8 The
NASD Code of Arbitration procedures referred any claim, dispute, or controversy
1. 829 P.2d 874 (Kan. 1992).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
3. H.R. REP. No. 96, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
4. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1982).
5. Id. at 24-25.
6. Skewes, 829 P.2d at 875. The Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration form,
or Form U-4, is widely used among securities dealers.
7. Id. The Form U-4 provided: "I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may
arise between me and my ftm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated
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arising out of or in connection with the business of any member of the Association
to arbitration at the instance of any member.9
Upon termination of employment by Shearson, Skewes filed suit alleging that
Shearson: "(1) breachedthe employment contract; (2) wrongfully refused to allow.
his pension rights to vest and to pay him under the pension plan; and (3)
discharged him in retaliation for filing a wage claim with the Kansas Department
of Human Services.' 0o In response, Shearson filed a motion to compel
arbitration;" Shearson claimed that the action arose out of the employment
relationship and that Skewes had agreed in the Form U4 to arbitrate all such
disputes.' 2 Shearson further alleged that the Federal Arbitration Act" preempts
the conflicting Kansas statute, Kansas Statute Annotated (K.S.A.) Section 5-
401," which explicitly invalidates arbitration clauses in employment contracts
and agreements requiring arbitration of tort claims.'5
In response, Skewes admitted that his employment involved interstate
commerce and that the F.A.A. mandated that the breach of employment and
pension rights claims were subject to the arbitration agreement.' 6  However,
9. Id at 875-76. Section 8(a) of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedures provides:
Any dispute, claim or controversy eligible for submission under Part I of this Code
between or among members and/or associated persons, and/or certain others, arising in
connection with the business of such member(s) or in connection with the activities of
such associated person(s), shall be arbitrated under this Code, at the instance of: (1) a
member against another member, [and] (2) a member against a person associated with a
member or person associated with a member against a member ....
Section 1, Part I of the NASD Code states:
This Code of Arbitration Procedure is prescribed and adopted pursuant to Article VII,
Section l(aX3) of the By-Laws of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(The "Association") for the arbitration of any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of
or in connection with the business of any member of the Association, with the exception
of disputes involving the insurance business of any member which is also an insurance
company: (1) between or among members; [and] (2) between or among members and
public customers, or others.
Skewes, 829 P.2d at 876.
10. Id. at 875.
11. Id at 876.
12. Id
13. See supra note 2. The Federal Arbitration Act provides that:
[W]ritten provision in any maritime transaction... involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
14. Skewes, 829 P.2d at 876.
15. Id K.S.A. § 5-401(c) provides: "The provisions of subsection (b) shall not apply to: . .
(3) any provision of a contract providing for arbitration of a claim in tort" KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-
401(c) (1991).
16. Skewes, 829 P.2d at 876.
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Skewes contended that the retaliatory discharge action sounded in tort and was
therefore exempted from arbitration by K.S.A. Section 5-401.' 7 Skewes further
asserted that Kansas courts have held that the F.A.A. does not preempt the Kansas
arbitration statute. 8
The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration with respect to both
the breach of employment contract and pension rights actions, but denied the
motion with respect to the retaliatory discharge action. 9 The trial court reasoned
that the retaliatory discharge claim was in no way related to the business of selling
securities, and thus, it was not within the scope of the arbitration agreement.2"
It further held that "federal law does not preclude a retaliatory discharge state
court action because the agreement [to arbitrate] between Shearson and Skewes
[was] not intrinsically related to the tort."21
On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court with respect
to the retaliatory discharge issue and remanded the action.2 2  The Court of
Appeals first held that the F.A.A. preempted the Kansas law restricting arbitration
agreements with respect to tort claims.23 Then, the court found that the
retaliatory discharge action arose out of or in connection with Shearson's business
and was therefore within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
24
On appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, Skewes argued for the first time that
the arbitration agreement was a part of the employment contract between Shearson
and him.25 As such, he claimed that the arbitration agreement was exempt from
the F.A.A., which specifically excludes employment contracts involving interstate
commerce from mandatory arbitration agreements.26 Skewes additionally
contended that the NASD arbitration agreement was ambiguous in that persons
signing the Form U-4 would believe it to relate only to disputes involving
27securities. Finally, Skewes argued that compulsory arbitration should be
allowed in labor disputes only when explicitly stated.28
In analyzing the issues, the Kansas Supreme Court first found that the
arbitration agreement was in fact an agreement with the securities exchange, not
with the employer; it was therefore not an employment contract subject to F.A.A.









25. Id. at 877.
26. Id. The F.A.A. contains the following exception: "[B]ut nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
27. Skewes, 829 P.2d at 879-80.
28. Id. at 880.
29. Id. at 877.
19931
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Skewes regarding the scope of arbitration and found that the Congressional intent
was to foreclose state legislative attempts to limit the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. 3' As such, the Kansas Supreme Court found that where the scope
of arbitrable issues is unclear, it should be resolved in favor of arbitration.31
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Depending on (1) the underlying relationship between parties to arbitration
agreements, and (2) the forum in which the dispute concerning the arbitration is
litigated, arbitration may be subject to three levels of authority - federal, state,
and the individual party agreements contained in the arbitration contract.
Individual party agreements are analyzed similarly to any other contract and can
alter, to some degree, the overriding state and federal policy objectives. State law
concerning arbitration is, in a majority of states, based upon some variation of the
Uniform Laws of Arbitration.3 ' At the federal level, the Federal Arbitration Act
sets forth a liberal policy aimed at the promulgation of arbitration proceedings.33
For a full understanding of how the federal and state policies interact and how
they ultimately affect the interpretation of the particular arbitration agreement,
some historical framework is essential.
A. Federal Law
At the federal level, the primary body of law relating to arbitration
agreements is contained in the Federal Arbitration Act.34 Section 1 of the F.A.A.
defines commerce 35 and maritime transactions 36 so as to fall within the scope
30. Id at 878.
31. Id at 882.
32. See infra note 44.
33. See Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 24. In Moses Cone, the Supreme Court announced that the
Federal Arbitration Act establishes 'that, as a matter of Federal Law, any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitration issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration .... ." Id. See also Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483, 489 (1986).
34. See supra note 2.
35. The F.A.A. defines "commerce" as:
[Clommerce among the several states or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another,
or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of
Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation ....
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
36. Maritime transactions are defined as "charter parties, bills of lading of water carriers,
agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other
matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy, would be embraced within admiralty
jurisdiction .. ""Id
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
4
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of the F.A.A. This section further provides an exemption for contracts of
employment.
37
Section 2 of the F.A.A. provides that written provisions within the scope of
Section I shall be valid, except upon "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."38 The proper application of Section 2 has been the
subject of much controversy.39 Some believe that the intent of the drafters was
for this section to be procedural and applicable only at the federal level.40 This
intent, however, has been ignored in light of the current belief that the federal
arbitration statutes are substantive, rather than procedural, in nature.4'
Furthermore, the scope of Section 2 has been judicially expanded to include
contracts dealing with interstate commerce or maritime transactions in either the
federal or state courts.42 Although the scope of Section 2 of the F.ANA. has been
judicially interpreted to apply to both state and federal proceedings, Sections 3 and
4, which concern the staying of court proceedings for actions referable to
arbitration and motions to compel arbitration, appear to apply only to federal
courts.
4 3
37. Id Specifically exempted from coverage are "contacts of employment of... any... class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id
38. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
39. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-12, 25-29 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 23 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
41. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987).
42. Id
43. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16n.10. However, the state courts seem to have recognized that the
stay provision of § 3 applies to state as well as federal courts. See Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 26 n.34.
19931
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B. State Law
Since the enactment of the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1955, a majority of
states have adopted some version of its basic provisions.44 Section 1 of the
U.A.A. corresponds to F.A.A, Section 2 by providing for validity of arbitration
agreements.45 This section, like its F.A.A. counterpart, provides that arbitration
agreements are only revocable upon "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the




Kansas adopted a version of the U.A.A. in 1973.47 K.S.A. Section 5-401
corresponds to Section 1 of the U.A.A. and Section 2 of the F.A.A. concemingthe
validity of arbitration agreements.' Subsections (a) and (b) provide that all
44. Thirty-five jurisdictions have adopted arbitration statutes patterned after the Uniform
Arbitration Act. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010-.180 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501
to -1518 (1982); ARL CODE ANN. §§ 16-108-201 to -224 (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§
13-22-201 to -223 (1987); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-5725 (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. §§
16-4301 to -4314 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-.20 (West Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-901
to -922 (1979); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 10 para. 101-23 (1987); IND. CODE §§ 34-4-2-1 to -22 (1986);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 679A.1-.14 (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-401 to -422 (1982); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 417.045-.230 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§
5927-5949 (1980); MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (West 1988); MICH- STAT. ANN. §§ 600.5001.5305 (Callaghan 1988); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 572.08-.30 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 435.350-.470 (Vernon Supp. 1989);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to -324 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2601 to -2622 (Supp. 1988);
NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38.015-.205 (Michie 1987); N.M. STAT; ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -22 (Michie
1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1-.20 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29.2-01 to -20 (Supp. 1989);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 15, §§ 801-818 (West Supp. 1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-7320
(Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-48-10 to -240 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 21-25A-1 to -38 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to -320 (Supp. 1988); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 224 to 238-6 (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31a-1 to -18
(1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5651-5681 (Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.01-.016
(Michie Supp. 1989); WYo. STAT. §§ 1-36-101 to -119 (1988). See Steven R. Leppard, Note,
Arbitration? Sure, But Only on Our Terms: Escape Clauses in Uninsured Motorist Policies, 1993 J.
DISP. RESOL 193, 198 n.52.
45. UNu'. ARW. AcT § 1, 7 U.LA. 4 (1978) provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a
written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the
parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract. This act also applies to arbitration agreements
between employers and employees or between their respective representatives unless
otherwise provided in the agreement
46. Id.
47. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 to -422 (1991).
48. K.S.A. § 5-401 provides:
(a) A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration is valid,
enforceable and irrevocable except upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), a provision in a written contract to submit to
arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and
irrevocable except upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract
6
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written agreements to submit present or future disputes to arbitration are valid and
enforceable "except upon grounds as exist at law or equity for the revocation of
any contract."'49 Subsection (c) excepts from the above subsections: (1) contracts
for insurance; (2) contracts between an employer and employees; and (3)
provisions of contracts providing for arbitration of a claim in tort."
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority
The Kansas Supreme Court was faced with two issues in the instant case:
(1) whether Section 1 of the F.A.A. preempts K.S.A. Section 5-401, which
prohibits the arbitration of tort claims; and (2) whether Skewes' retaliatory
discharge action arose out of or in connection with his employer's business, thus
becoming subject to arbitration as required in the Form U-4.
In addressing the preemption issue, Justice Six, writing for the majority, first
noted that pursuant to past decisions, the arbitration agreement referenced in the
Form U-4 was not an employment contract.52 The court reasoned that the
agreement to arbitrate was actually between the NASD and the plaintiff and was
thus not exempted from Section 1 of the F.A.A.53 The court next recognized the
Supreme Court decisions holding that Section 2 of the F.A.A. creates a "body of
federal substantive law... applicable in both federal and state courts."54 States
may not place additional limitations on these federal mandates.55 As a result, the
court acknowledged that the F.A.A. requires state courts to enforce arbitration
agreements that are legitimate under the F.A.A. provisions, but that may be
contrary to state policy.56 This reasoning led the court to conclude that the
provision of K.S.A. Section 5-401, prohibiting the arbitration of tort claims, was
preempted by the F.A.A. and was ineffectual under the facts of the case.57
(c) The provisions of subsection (b) shall not apply to: (1) Contracts of insurance; (2)
contracts between an employer and employees, or their respective representatives; or (3)
any provision of a contract providing for arbitration of a claim in tort.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1991).
49. Id
50. Id.
51. Skewes, 829 P.2d at 875.
52. Id at 877 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 878 (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (citing Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983))).
55. Skewes, 829 P.2d at 878.
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The court next addressed the scope of employment issue.58 The plaintiff
contended that the "arising out of or in connection with the business of any
member" language was ambiguous in that persons signing the agreement would
understand it to require arbitration only of disputes involving securities.59 The
court rejected this narrow interpretation of the arbitration agreement. 60 In its
analysis, the court relied upon Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp.61 in finding that under the F.A.AL, any doubts concerning the
scope of an arbitration agreement should be resolved in favor of arbitration.62
Viewing the issue from this perspective, the court noted that the context of the
cause of action involved significant aspects of the employer's business
activities. 63 Due to this business activity connection, the court stayed Skewes'
action and held that submission to arbitration was proper.'
B. The Dissent
Justices Lockett and Allegrucci dissented from the majority decision. 65 The
dissent first stated that whenever possible, it was the court's duty "to uphold the
public policy of the State."' s The dissent then found that the clear intent of the
Kansas Legislature was that parties could not contract to arbitrate claims in tort.67
The dissent relied on the reasoning of a recent Alabama Supreme Court
decision" to highlight the contractual nature of the arbitration agreement.69 As
such, the dissent advocated an analysis that attempted to determine the true intent
of the parties. This test emphasized two tasks the court should attempt to resolve:
(1) ascertain whether the parties intended the particular dispute to be arbitrated as
evidenced by the language contained in the agreement; and (2) when ambiguity
appears in the contract, maintain a "healthy regard" for the federal policy favoring
arbitration and find in favor of arbitration when doubts exist as to the proper scope
of the agreement.70 This test, the dissent believed, placed reasonable limits on
58. Id
59. Id at 879-80.
60. Id. at 880.
61. 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
62. Skewes, 829 P.2d at 881.
63. Id at 880. The court noted Shearson's contention that the discharge from employment was
a result of unsatisfactory sales performance by the plaintiff. Skewes, on the other hand, contended that
the discharge was in retaliation for the earlier filing of a wage claim. The court evidently found the
source of the disagreement irrelevant in light of the liberal federal policy in favor of resolving doubts
in favor of arbitration.
64. Id. at 882.
65. Id at 883-84 (Lockett, J., and Allegrucci, J., dissenting).
66. Id at 883.
67. Id
68. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Clark, 558 So. 2d 358 (Ala. 1990).
69. Skewes, 829 P.2d at 883.
70. Id at 884.
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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the liberal policy in favor of arbitration by excluding matters that "clearly fall
outside the scope of the contract or agreement."
71
V. COMMENT
The crux of this case revolves around the intent of the parties analyzed in
light of what the judge deemed to be the controlling statutory policies. It is
apparent that the majority believed that the F.A.A.'s policy toward liberal
interpretation of arbitration agreements is controlling," while the dissent felt that
the Kansas statutes prohibiting the arbitration of tort actions control.73 What is
less apparent is that the court seems to place less emphasis upon the true intent of
the parties once the contract is found to be ambiguous.
In the case at hand, the provision "arising out of business" found in the Form
U-4 creates the "ambiguity" which the federal policy capitalizes upon by finding
in favor of arbitration. 74 The dissent, however, while finding ambiguity and
recognizing the federal policy favoring arbitration, further found that under the
particular facts at issue (arbitration of a tort dispute), the state policy should
counteract the federal policy and allow resolution within the courts."
What appears odd in this analysis is the apparent predisposition of both the
majority and the dissent to find ambiguity in the language of the Form U-4. Both
opinions then followed the policy, state or federal, which it believed controlled
without resorting to extrinsic evidence.76 It seems that this analysis fails to give
due consideration to the most important element of any contract - party intent.
By resorting to overriding policy objectives rather than extrinsic evidence that
might clarify ambiguities within the document, the court fails to effectuatethe true
intent of the parties.
Under accepted contract interpretation principles, clear, unambiguous
contracts are not to be made ambiguous by the introduction of extrinsic
evidence.7" However, once ambiguity appears either on the face of the contract
or in its application, extrinsic evidence may be introduced to ascertain the true
intent.78 In the case at hand, it appears that no one seriously disputes the fact
that ambiguity exists. This is evidenced by both the majority and dissenting
71. Id
72. Id at 875.
73. Id. at 883.
74. Id. at 879-80.
75. Id. at 884.
76. While Skewes alleged that the parties entering into the contract would never have intended
or believed that a retaliatory discharge action would fall within the parameters of this agreement, the
majority rejected this in light of the federal policy advocating arbitration. Id at 880, 882.
77. 17A AM. JUL 2D Contracts § 337 (1991).
78. Id § 197.
19931
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opinions going beyond the face of the document and resorting to external policies
in their analysis of the contract. 9
It is also a well-settled doctrine that parties are allowed to contract with
regard to future events so long as the contract provisions do not violate public
policy."0 In this case, the court found no provision of the contract or intent of
the parties which violated public policy. Had they found such a provision or
intent, such provisions could be held void."' Once a provision of the contract is
found void as against public policy, it would then seem logical to resort to federal
and/or state policy to salvage the agreement. However, this court forgoes the
analysis of party intent in order to explore what it believes are more pressing
concerns - federal or state policy. This, in effect, ignores the basic contract
interpretation principles discussed above and gives effect to policies which were
not likely contemplated by the individual parties.
In order to find the true intent of the agreement, it seems that the better
policy would be to resort to extrinsic evidence upon finding ambiguity within the
contract. If extrinsic evidence still fails to reveal a clear intent, or the intent found
runs contrary to public policy, then the courts should concern themselves with
these general state or federal policies. To do otherwise would require parties to
clearly provide for every conceivable contingency on the face of the document or
be subject to policies which may or may not be in their best interests. This is not
required in normal contract interpretation'
VI. CONCLUSION
By allowing individuals to contract with respect to future arbitration, the
legislature has given them a margin of control over how future disputes will be
resolved. This ability to alter the normal course of dispute resolution is based
upon the intent of the parties to the agreement. This intent should not be
overlooked merely because it is not clearly expressed on the face of the contract.
Instead, long standing principles of contract interpretation should be applied in an
effort to ascertain the true intent of the agreement.
ERIC M. LANDOLL
79. Skewes, 829 P.2d at 878, 884.
80. 17A AM. JU1L 2D Contracts § 257 (1991).
81. Id § 195.
82. Id § 197.
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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